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MARTINEZ V. LONG ISLAND JEWISH
HILLSIDE MEDICAL CENTER,
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
COMPENSATION WITHOUT A
PHYSICAL MANIFESTATION OF THE
HARM: HAS NEW YORK GONE TOO
FAR?
In a majority of states, recovery for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress is granted only in a limited number of cases.' In
See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979). The court held that
damages for shock or mental anguish resulting from witnessing an injury to a third person,
caused through another's negligence, were recoverable. Id. at 116, 593 P.2d at 669. The
recovery, however, was limited in that the mental distress must have been manifested as a
physical injury and that such distress resulted from witnessing an injury to a close, personal
relative of the claimant. Id. at 117, 593 P.2d at 669-70. See also Towns v. Anderson, 195
Colo. 517, 520, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1978) (where emotional distress manifested in a
form of physical injury, recovery allowed even absent a showing of bodily harm or immedi-
ate impact); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 134, 447 N.E.2d 109, 112-
13 (1983) (negligence of defendant, causing accident resulting in serious emotional harm
needed no contemporaneous physical injury, but rather, permanent medical and psycho-
logical attention found sufficient for recovery); Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d
232, 235, 249 P.2d 843, 845 (1952) (negligent act causing mental suffering and loss of
sleep with no physical injuries not compensable); Butler v. Pardue, 415 So. 2d 249, 252
(La. Ct. App. 1982) ("fright, fear or mental anguish while an ordeal is in progress is legally
compensable"); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So. 2d 898, 901-02 (Miss. 1981)
(where no physical injury, sickness or medically identifiable mental injury suffered, dam-
ages for unnecessary embarrassment through another's negligence, not recoverable);
Seidenbach's, Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.2d 185, 187 (Okla. 1961) (damages for mental
anguish unaccompanied by or unconnected to physical injuries cannot be recovered on
account of negligent breach of contract); Logan v. St. Luke's Gen. Hosp., 65 Wash. 2d
914, 915, 400 P.2d 296, 296 (1965) (where "no malice or intent to do harm is alleged,
there must be either an immediate physical invasion . . . or a direct possibility of such
invasion in order that recovery may be had for mental anguish .... ).
As stated in RESTATEMEN (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, at 461 (1965), the general rule
regarding liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress alone is "if the actor's con-
duct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emo-
tional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without
bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional dis-
turbance." Id.
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most of these situations, the plaintiff is required to show either an
accompanying physical injury3 or a physical manifestation of the
emotional injury." There are currently three exceptions in New
York' for which this showing is not required. These involve the
' See infra note 5.
s See Bullard v. Central Vt. Ry., 565 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1977). The court awarded erno-
tional distress damages to a railway company employee who suffered a foot injury as a
result of defendant's negligently caused accident. Id. at 197-98. See also Ferrara v. Gal-
luchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 18, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 250, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997, 999 (1958)(where plaintiff suffered burn on shoulder through doctor's negligent X-ray treatments,
neurosis and mental distress about possibility of cancer allowed as part of recovery); Holm-
quist v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 516, 526 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977) (where
plaintiff sustained severe physical injuries as a result of car accident, court considered
mental pain and suffering in computing damages); Hayes v. New York Cent. R.R., 311
F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1962) (in determining damages for plaintiffs frost bitten foot inju-
ries, court permitted damages for anxiety of threat of amputation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 436 comment c (1965).
" See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). In Bat-
talla, plaintiff was awarded a recovery for emotional distress without a physical injury when
the suffering included "severe emotional and neurological disturbances with residual physi-
cal manifestations." Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35. See also Towns v.
Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 520, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1978) (where boy's witnessing of
house on fire with sister inside caused emotional distress and later manifested itself in
forms of physical injuries, court permitted recovery); First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So.
2d 324, 334 (1975) (no physical impact required to recover for "genuine physical conse-
quences of fright, shock, or other mental distress resulting from a negligent act"). Cf.
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). In Tobin,
the court denied recovery although there were physical manifestations of emotional dis-
tress because the plaintiff was not within the zone-of-danger. Id. at 613, 249 N.E.2d at 42 1,
301 N.Y.S.2d at 557; Comment, Negligent Infliction of Prenatal Death: New York's Unrecom-
pensed Injury After Tebbutt v. Virostek, 19 CONN. L. REV. 365, 371 (1987); Comment, Negli-
gently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 Gao. L.J. 1237, 1240-41
(1971).
' See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). The
court sustained recovery for plaintiff's mental distress as a result of receiving a notice
falsely informing her that her mother had died, when in fact, she was still alive. Id. at 379-
80, 334 N.E.2d at 591, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 638-39. The exceptional recovery was based on
the fact that the defendant hospital breached a duty owed directly to the daughter, and on
the seriousness of a message announcing death. Id. at 383, 334 N.E.2d at 593, 372
N.Y.S.2d at 642-43. Cf. Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 62 N.Y.2d 523, 530, 467 N.E.2d 502,
505, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (1984). The court denied the parents of an infant, under the
care of a hospital nursery, damages for the hospital's negligence, causing them grief and
worry upon their child's disappearance and later return. Id. The Jamaica Hospital case lim-
itedJohnson to its specific facts, thereby creating an exception to the rule in cases involving
the negligent transmission of information regarding death. Id. See also Lando v. State, 39
N.Y.2d 808, 808, 351 N.E.2d 426, 426, 385 N.Y.S.2d 759, 759 (1976) (court permitted
recovery for failure to recover plaintiffs daughter's body for 11 days, resulting in emo-
tional injury to plaintiff); Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., 202 N.Y. 259, 262, 95 N.E. 695,
696 (1911) (recovery for emotional distress resulting from negligent mishandling of a
corpse based on the plaintiffs quasi-property right in the body was allowed). Cf. Bovsun v.
Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 228-29, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 361 (1984)
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negligent transmission of a message announcing death, the negli-
gent mishandling of corpses, and the zone-of-danger rule. Re-
cently, in Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center,' a
case which did not involve any of the previously noted exceptions,
the New York Court of Appeals allowed recovery for the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress without a showing of any
physical harm.7
In Martinez, a mother was awarded recovery for emotional dis-
tress suffered as a result of submitting to an unnecessary abor-
tion.' The facts of Martinez, while quite unique, share some simi-
larities with two widely litigated areas of law: wrongful life cases'
(court allowed recovery to plaintiffs who were in the zone-of-danger, that is, one who was
himself in the same physical danger as person suffering the physical injury or death
through defendant's negligence and yet only received emotional injury from viewing such
death or serious injury of another member of his immediate family).
* Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d
538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987).
7 Id. at 699, 512 N.E.2d at 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
* Id.
* See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). A
"wrongful life" cause of action involves the birth of a wanted, but abnormal child who
would not have been born but for the doctor's negligence in failing to inform the parents
of specific risks and problems of treatment. Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 808-09, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 896-97. The parents sought, in addition to other damages, recovery for emotional and
mental harm suffered as a result of the birth of their retarded child. Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d
at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs could
not recover for emotional injury as part of their monetary damages, for this sort of injury
was too speculative. Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902. See also Moores v.
Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1024-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (no claim allowed for suffering
and mental anguish arising from pregnancy and birth of child with Larsen's Syndrome due
to medical expert's negligence); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 113, 366 N.E.2d 64,
66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (1977) (parents of child born with Tay-Sachs disease denied
recovery for emotional distress suffered as a result of doctor's negligence); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975) (child's parents not entitled to damages for
their emotional suffering due to negligence of doctor in failing to diagnose mother's Ger-
man measles). But see Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (4th
Dep't 1977). The parents of a mongoloid child, as a result of a doctor's negligence in
diagnosis, were permitted to recover for mental anguish incident to the birth. Id. at 81,
394 N.Y.S.2d at 940. See generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 55, at 370(5th ed. 1984) (a distinction between wrongful birth claims brought by parents for their
damages and wrongful life claims brought on behalf of the child is addressed); Kashi, The
Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1409, 1429 (1977) (author
submitted parents in wrongful life situations should be allowed recovery for emotional suf-
fering). "[Tihe parents do not sue because the child is unloved or a burden; they sue be-
cause they must live with the excruciating pain of seeing a child whom they dearly love
face life under harsh disabilities." Id. at 1429; Note, Father and Mother Know Best; Defining
the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1502-03 (1978)(author noted the difficulty of measuring the parents' emotional distress injuries in wrong-
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and cases involving the infliction of harm to a fetus.1" Both types
of cases have repeatedly surfaced in New York.
This Comment will examine these areas and address the role of
requiring some physical indication of harm. 1 It will then argue
that although the decision in Martinez was the correct one, the
court should not have overlooked the physical manifestation re-
quirement." This Comment will then examine the state of the law
in California, which has abandoned the requirement since 1980,11
and analyze the problems which have resulted. Finally, some alter-
ful life cases, yet treated differently in other areas of tort law).
0 See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951). The court held that the
child was entitled to damages for the negligent infliction of harm while in utero, but his
mother was not entitled to a recovery for the ensuing emotional distress. Id. at 351-57, 102
N.E.2d at 692-95. See also Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980). In Vaccaro, the court held that the defendant (a drug manufacturer)
owed no duty to a mother who suffered from emotional distress as a result of her child
being born with severe deformities due to the defendant's product. Id. at 810, 418 N.E.2d
at 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 871. The mother did not allege physical injuries, and therefore,
the court held that she was not entitled to recover for emotional and psychic harm. Id. at
810-11, 418 N.E.2d at 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 871. See also Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d
931, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1985). Plaintiff-mother alleged emotional dis-
tress as a result of a negligent amniocentesis causing her to deliver a stillborn child. Id. at
932, 483 N.E.2d at 1143, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1011. Recovery for emotional distress was de-
nied on the theory that the mother failed to learn of the injury to her child until well after
it was inflicted. Id. See generally Note, Recovery for Tortious Death of the Unborn, 33 S.C.L. REV.
797, 811 (1982) (measuring damages in death resulting from prenatal injuries is extremely
troublesome).
" See supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment b (1965). As justification for
the requirement of some physical injury with a claim for emotional distress, comment b
provides three reasons:
One is that emotional disturbance which is not so severe and serious as to have phys-
ical consequences is normally in the realm of the trivial .... It is likely to be so
temporary ... and so relatively harmless and unimportant, that the task of compen-
sating for it would unduly burden the courts and the defendants .... [Slecond is
that in the absence of the guarantee of genuineness provided by the resulting bodily
harm, such emotional disturbance may be too easily feigned .... [T]o allow recov-
ery for it might open too wide a door for false claimants who have suffered no real
harm at all. The third is that where the defendant has been merely negligent, with-
out any element of intent to do harm, his fault is not so great that he should be
required to make good a purely mental disturbance.
Id. See also Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pan-
dora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 530-31 (1984); Note, The Negligent Infliction of Mental
Distress: The Scope of Duty and Foreseeability of Inju7y, 57 N.D.L. REV. 577, 580-81 (1981).
"a See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980). See generally Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress As An Independent Cause of
Action in California: Do Defendants Face Unlimited Liability?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 181,
183 (1982) ("(u]ntil Molien, . . . California courts refused to allow a plaintiff to state a cause
of action purely for negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical injury").
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natives are proposed which would have enabled the court to hold
for the plaintiff without abandoning important policy consider-
ations.
I. NEW YORK LAW PRIOR TO Martinez
A. Wrongful Life Cases
In Howard v. Lecher,14 the plaintiffs sued a doctor after their
daughter was born with Tay-Sachs disease. They claimed that the
defendant was negligent in failing to properly counsel them.1
They also averred that if they had known of the existence of the
disease, they would have terminated the pregnancy.16
In holding for the defendant, the New York Court of Appeals
pointed to its repeated practice of denying recovery for emotional
injuries suffered as a result of physical injuries sustained by an-
other."' The injury complained of did not directly arise from the
defendant's breach of duty, but rather, it arose from watching the
child suffer.1 8
The court also denied recovery for emotional suffering in Becker
v. Schwartz."' In Becker, the plaintiff was a 37 -year old mother who
was in the defendant's care from the tenth week of pregnancy un-
til birth.2 0 The defendant failed to inform the plaintiff of the in-
creased risk of Down's Syndrome in children of older parents. 1
14 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
15 Id. at 110, 366 N.E.2d at 65, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 364. The plaintiff-parents claimed that
the defendant, being aware of the fact that they were Eastern European Jews, should have
known of the high risk that the child could suffer from Tay-Sachs disease. Id.
1" Id. The plaintiffs did not claim that the defendant was responsible for the child's af-
fliction with Tay-Sachs or the inevitable death. Id. They alleged that the doctor should be
liable for the emotional suffering which was caused by the "birth, degeneration, and death
of the child." Id. at 111, 366 N.E.2d at 65, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
17 Id. at 112, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365. The court stated that, "No cause
of action exists, irrespective of the relationship between the parties or whether one was a
witness . . . for the unintentional infliction of harm to a person solely by reason of that
person's mental and emotional reaction to a direct injury suffered by another." Id.
18 Id. at 112-13, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
10 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
20 Id. at 405, 386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
21 Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The plaintiff also contended that
neither she nor her husband were ever advised of the availability of an amniocentesis test
to determine whether the fetus would be affected with Down's Syndrome. Id. Had they
known of the test they alleged they would have had it performed and could have prevented
the birth of their child. Id at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
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As a result, no tests were given and the pregnancy went to full
term. The plaintiff's daughter suffered from the disease and re-
quired institutionalization. The court stated that the claim for
emotional distress was too speculative2 and therefore denied re-
lief. These mental injuries, according to the court, would be miti-
gated by "the experience of love associated with the birth of every
child.""
Typically, wrongful life actions are also brought on the child's
behalf.2 5 Here the courts have held that the infant suffered "no
legally cognizable injury. '2  Virtually all courts have consistently
denied recovery for a wrongful life claim brought on the child's
behalf 2 7
22 Id.
33 Id. at 414, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
24 d.
" See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
897 (1978). See also Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 699, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 653
(1976) (child brought wrongful life action after defendant had negligently performed an
abortion on his mother); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 24, 227 A.2d 689, 690 (1967)
,(child with birth defect sued doctor for failure to properly diagnose effects on birth of
mother's disease); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 482, 223 N.E.2d 343, 343, 276
N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (1966) (child sued state where mother was a mental patient and as a
result of state's negligence, child was born out of wedlock); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d
295, 300, 215 N.W.2d 9, 13 (1974) (illegitimate child sued father for mental pain and
anguish resulting from her wrongful birth); Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth.- Medi-
cal Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 715 (1982)
(discussion of merits of both wrongful life and wrongful birth claims).
26 See Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 401, 386 N.E.2d at 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 895. The court
stated: -[T]here is no precedent for recognition . . . of the fundamental right of a child to
be born as a whole functional human being." Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d
at 900 (quoting from Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (2d
Dep't. 1977)). See also Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 22, 227 A.2d at 689. In Gleitman, the plaintiff
contracted German measles at an early stage of her pregnancy. Id. at 22, 227 A.2d at 689.
The defendant assured her that there would be no adverse affects upon the child. Id. at 23,
227 A.2d at 690. After the child was born with birth defects, the plaintiff claimed that she
might have secured an abortion had she been informed of the risk to the child from the
disease. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. The action was based on a claim on behalf of the child
that he never should have been born. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692. In denying the claim, the
court noted that "the infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life
with defects against the utter void of non-existence, but it is impossible to make such a
determination." Id.
"See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KE-ETON ON TORTS § 55, at 371 (5th ed. 1984). See also
Note, Wrongful Life and a Fundamental Right to be Born Healthy, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 537,
539-40 (1978) (proven pecuniary damages are allowed to parents in wrongful life claims);
Note, A Child May Recover Special Damages But Not General Damages in a Claim for Wrongful
Life: Turpin v. Satini, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 296, 298 (1982) (wrongful life cases are almost
universally rejected).
103
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 3: 98, 1987
There is, however, one way by which defendants can be held
liable. Recovery was allowed in Becker for pecuniary loss suffered
by the parents.2 ' Generally, these include either the costs involved
in institutionalization or any other additional costs arising from
the disease."9 These damages serve, not to make the plaintiff
whole, but to reimburse him or her for losses which are less
speculative. 0
B. Infliction of Physical Harm to the Fetus
In Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp.,"' the plaintiff-mother took a drug,
manufactured by the defendant, during her pregnancy.32 As a re-
sult, her child was born severely deformed. The court of appeals
refused to recognize a cause of action for her emotional distress."
The court observed that the mother alleged no physical injuries
and therefore was unable to collect for emotional distress." In
" See Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
" See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1981) (parents sued for future
care and maintenance associated with a child inflicted with rubella syndrome); Schroeder v.
Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 57, 432 A.2d 834, 835 (1981) (parents sued for the additional expenses
they would incur in caring for their children who suffered from cystic fibrosis); Becker, 46
N.Y.2d at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897 (1978) (plaintiffs sued for the
extraordinary care and treatment associated with Down's Syndrome).
"o See Schroeder, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981). On the matter of pecuniary damages,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that the defendant should have foreseen that
the child could suffer from certain diseases and that if afflicted, would sustain certain medi-
cal expenses. Id. at 65, 432 A.2d at 841. In Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), the court opined that "to permit the plaintiff to
recover for pecuniary loss while precluding recovery for alleged emotional injuries . . .
does not run counter to this court's previous decisions." Id. at 414, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 902. The defendant in Becker breached a duty which allowed the plaintiff to
recover damages for "the proven harmful consequences proximately caused by the
breach." Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902. See also Note, supra note 9, at
1506, 1514-15 (discussion of what physicians should reasonably foresee, with regard to ge-
netic counseling of patients). If a physician is held to have been able to foresee a particular
defect, he should have foreseen the medical expenses associated with the defect as well. d.
at 1515.
Si 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
Id. at 811, 418 N.E.2d at 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). The
plaintiff took the drug Delalutin, which was manufactured and marketed by the defendant.
Id. The purpose of the drug was to prevent a miscarriage. d. The plaintiffs doctor, also a
defendant in the action, prescribed the drug for the plaintiff. Id.
"Id.
I /d. It should be noted that whether the plaintiff could recover for physical injuries
sustained as a result of the defendant's negligence was not addressed in the court's opinion.
Id. Rather, only "the legal question [of] whether in the circumstances [the plaintiff-mother]
is entitled to recover for emotional and psychic harm" was considered. Id.
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this line of cases, the mother is often viewed as a third party
bystander."
The Vaccaro holding was based on the rule set forth in Battalla
v. State. 6 In Battalla, an employee at a ski slope placed the plain-
tiff on a chairlift without properly securing him.17 The child, al-
though not physically hurt, was seriously frightened.3 8 He demon-
strated "severe emotional and neurological disturbances with
residual physical manifestations. '"3 9 The court of appeals held that
the plaintiff fulfilled the requirement of physical harm necessary
for an emotional suffering cause of action. "
This requirement was altered when New York adopted the
zone-of-danger rule in Bovsun v. Sanperi.'1 In Bovsun, the plaintiff
was awarded damages for emotional distress which occurred as a
result of witnessing injury to her husband in an automobile acci-
dent in which she was also involved. 4' The court noted that be-
' See Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 932, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1143, 493 N.Y.S.2d
1010, 1011 (1985); Vaccaro, 52 N.Y.2d at 810, 418 N.E.2d at 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
See generally Comment, supra note 4, at 385, 389 (case-by-case discussion of how New
York's courts have handled the problem).
" 10 N.Y.2d 237, 239, 176 N.E.2d 729, 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (1961).
37 Id.
88Id.
'Id.
"0 See Battalla v. State, 10 N,Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). In its
decision the court overruled Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
The Mitchell court found that there could be no recovery for injuries, physical or mental,
incurred by fright negligently induced. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354. The court concluded
that a wrongdoer should be responsible for the natural and proximate consequences of his
misconduct. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355. The Battalla court stated that the only substantial
policy argument of Mitchell is that the damages or injuries are somewhat speculative and
difficult to prove. Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
However, it concluded that in the difficult cases, the court must look to the quality and
genuineness of the proof. Id. By showing that he suffered from physical manifestations of
emotional distress, the plaintiff in Battalla assured the court that his claim was genuine. Id.
at 239, 240, 242, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35, 36, 38.
" 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
42 Id. at 224, 461 N.E.2d at 844, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 358. The facts of Bovsun are somewhat
unique. Id. The station wagon in which the Bovsun family was riding had stopped at the
side of the highway. Id. Mr. Bovsun got out of the car, went around to the rear and leaned
inside the open tailgate window. Id. Mrs. Bovsun was seated in the front passenger seat,
and their daughter remained in the rear seat. Id. At this point, their car was struck in the
rear by the defendant's automobile. Id. Mr. Bovsun was seriously injured as a result of
being pinned between the two vehicles. Id. The mother and daughter were jolted in the
car but escaped without serious injuries. Id. While neither the mother nor the daughter
actually saw the defendant's vehicle strike Mr. Bovsun, both were instantly aware of the
impact and the fact that he must have been hit. Id. Each thereafter immediately observed
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cause the plaintiff was within the zone-of-danger4 3 the defendant
breached a duty which he owed directly to her."
Included in plaintiff's damages was the emotional distress
caused by witnessing "the suffering of an immediate family mem-
ber who is also injured by the defendant's conduct."4 The court
did not require that the plaintiff show any physical injuries from
the accident. 4" It is unclear as to whether or not physical manifes-
tations were required.'7
In 1985, the court of appeals had a chance to apply the Bovsun
rule to a case involving physical harm to an unborn child. In Teb-
butt v. Virostek," the plaintiff's child was stillborn as a result of a
negligently performed amniocentesis." The mother claimed that
she was within the zone-of-danger and should be afforded a recov-
ery for her emotional suffering.5" In denying recovery, the court
held that the observation of serious injury or death to a family
member must be contemporaneous with the conduct causing the
injury or death. 51 The court held that the plaintiff did not dis-
him pinned between the vehicles. Id. at 225, 461 N.E.2d at 844, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
43 Id. at 230, 461 N.E.2d at 848, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 362. The court held:
[W]here a defendant negligently exposes a plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of bodily
injury or death, the plaintiff may recover, as a proper element of his or her dam-
ages, damages for injuries suffered in consequence of the observation of the serious
injury or death of a member of his or her immediate family - assuming, of course,
that it is established that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing
about such injury or death.
Id. at 230-31, 461 N.E.2d at 848, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
" Id. at 233, 461 N.E.2d at 850, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
" See id. at 229, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 361. The court recognized the
right of a plaintiff, to whom the defendant owed but breached a duty of care, to recover as
an element of his damages, that part of his injury attributable to emotional distress caused
by the contemporaneous observation of injury to an immediate family member, caused by
the same conduct of the defendant. Id. at 231, 461 N.E.2d at 438, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
The court also stated that the emotional distress must be serious. Id.
Id.
,7 Id. The court noted that the emotional distress must be verifiable. Id. The court re-
ferred to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 436(3) comment g (1965) (external factors
are necessary to corroborate plaintiff's testimony).
4e 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1985).
" /d. at 932, 483 N.E.2d at 1143, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1011.
" Id.
51 See id. The plaintiff tried to recover damages for her "pain, severe disappointment,
anxiety, despondency, bitterness and suffering" resulting from the stillbirth of her child.
Id. The court stated that the plaintiff alleged no physical injury distinct from that suffered
by the fetus. Id. As a result, her only avenue of recovery could have been under a zone-of-
danger theory. Id. The court, relying on Bovsun, denied her claim because her observation
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cover the injury to her child until well after it was inflicted.'
In cases involving the infliction of physical harm by the defend-
ant directly upon the fetus, the courts have allowed a recovery by
the infant for the injuries suffered.3 This recovery is limited only
to cases where the infant survives." By providing for some recov-
ery, the courts have created a means by which to hold defendants
liable for their negligent conduct.5
II. THE Martinez DECISION
In Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center," the
court of appeals awarded a mother recovery for emotional distress
suffered as a result of submitting to an unnecessary abortion.87
Mrs. Martinez was taking small doses of a steroid on a daily basis
when she discovered that she was pregnant.5 8 She was referred to
the defendant for genetic counseling regarding the possible dan-
was not contemporaneous with the defendant's conduct. Id. The court implicitly viewed
the plaintiff-mother as a third party bystander and applied the principles attendant there-
under. Id.
." Id. On this point, the court ruled that the case was governed by Vaccaro v. Squibb
Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980). Both cases involved
-emotional injuries caused by harm done to the child in utero, which the mother did not
learn of until after birth. Id. That event occurred some time after the harm was inflicted.
'Id.
See Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 398, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951); Hughson
v. St. Francis Hosp., 92 App. Div. 2d 131, 135, 459 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (2d Dep't 1983). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1965). The Restatement provides, "(1) [Olne
who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the child for the
harm if the child is born alive." Id. The reporter's note states that all American jurisdic-
tions permit recovery in the above situation. Id. reporter's note (1) (1982).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 reporter's note (2) (1977). Section 869
states: "If the child is not born alive, there is no liability unless the applicable wrongful
death statute so provides." Id. The courts are split as to whether or not wrongful death
applies to a stillborn fetus. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 567, 565 P.2d 122,
124, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1977) (recovery denied as wrongful death did not apply); En-
dresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 482, 248 N.E.2d 901, 902, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (1969)
(New York's wrongful death statute was not intended to apply); In re Logan's Estate, 3
N.Y.2d 800, 800, 144 N.E.2d 644, 644, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3, 3 (1957). But see Todd v. San-
didge Contr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 75 (4th Cir. 1964) (wrongful death action can be had for
stillbirth of eight month old fetus); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis.
2d 14, 16, 148 N.W.2d 107, 109 (1967) (unproven medical fact that fetus does not have
separate juridical existence).
See supra notes 53 and 54 and accompanying text.
70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987).
SId.
SId. at 698, 512 N.E.2d at 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
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gers to her unborn child. 9 The defendant negligently advised her
that her baby would be born with the congenital birth defect of
microcephaly (small brain) or anencephaly (no brain)." The de-
fendant advised her based on the belief that her dosage was
500mg.61 However, the actual dosage was .5 mg., an amount that
was not likely to harm the fetus.62 Based on the defendant's ad-
vice, Mrs. Martinez submitted to an abortion, believing that the
extraordinary circumstances justified such an act. 2
Upon discovering the defendant's error, Mrs. Martinez suffered
mental anguish and depression from her awareness that she need-
lessly committed an act "in violation of her deep-seated convic-
tions."" There was no indication that she suffered from any phys-
ical injuries nor was there evidence of any physical manifestation
of the emotional distress.65 The court declared that the defendant
breached a duty it owed to the plaintiff, which resulted directly in
the emotional suffering." As a result, a seemingly new cause of
action in New York was established.67
Prior to Martinez, New York law provided that for a recovery in
emotional distress absent some physical injury, the plaintiff's case
must fall within one of New York's exceptions." If the plaintiff is
M Id.
I ld. at 698-99, 512 N.E.2d at 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
" See Brief for Respondent at 12, Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical
Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987).
SId. at 19. The probability of a healthy baby was 95-98% at worst. Id.
"Martinez, 70 N.Y.2d at 699, 512 N.E.2d at 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 955. Mrs. Martinez
testified that to her, abortion was a sin, except under the extraordinary circumstances of
her situation. Id.
SId.
Id. 70 N.Y.2d 697, 699, 512 N.E.2d at 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
Id. at 699, 512 N.E.2d at 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
"7 Id.
" See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958). In
Ferrara, the plaintiff was suffering from shoulder ailments and received a series of X-ray
treatments by the defendant. Id. at 18, 152 N.E.2d at 250, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 997. As a
result of these treatments, blisters formed on the plaintiff's shoulder and she was diagnosed
as having chronic radiodermatitis. Id. This condition was caused by the X-ray therapy. Id.
The court awarded the plaintiff a recovery for her emotional distress (cancerophobia) in-
curred as a result of the defendant's treatments. Id. The court stated: "Not only fright and
shock, but other kinds of mental injury are marked by definite physical symptoms, which
are capable of clear medical proof." Id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999. See
also Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 810, 418 N.E.2d 386, 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d
871, 871 (1980) (recovery denied because plaintiff made no claim of contemporaneous
physical harm to herself); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219
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within the zone-of-danger, then according to Bovsun, no showing
of physical injury is necessary.69 Traditionally, to be within the
zone-of-danger,70 the plaintiff must be at risk of the same type of
injury that the third party actually suffers.71 While it is true that
Mrs. Martinez was at the risk of some physical harm that may be
associated with abortion, it is submitted that it was not the same
type of harm that her baby faced, specifically, inevitable death.
Furthermore, her observation of the injury was not contempora-
neous with the defendant's act .7 Therefore, a zone-of-danger
analysis would not justify the Martinez holding.
Two other exceptions to the physical harm rule were set forth
in Johnson v. New York.72 The court of appeals stated that in cases
N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 (1961) (suffering included "severe emotional and neurological distur-
bances with residual physical manifestations"). See generally Smith, Relation of Emotions to
Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944) (persons suf-
fering substantial physical injury from psychic stimuli should be compensated). See also
supra notes 5, 30-32, 35 and 54-58 and accompanying text.
" See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 231, 461 N.E.2d 843, 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357,
363 (1984); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Formulating the Psycho-Legal
Inquiry, 18 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 401, 405 (1984); Comment, The Increasingly Disparate Stan-
dards of Recovey for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Injuries, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1020-21
(1983) (emotional well-being of individual is as important as physical welfare). One author
has noted:
Generally, the zone-of-danger rule widens the scope of liability for infliction of emo-
tional distress beyond situations of mere physical impact to situations where the
plaintiff has been physically threatened by the defendant's negligent conduct. As
long as the plaintiff can show that the defendant's conduct posed a physical threat,
recovery for emotional harm will generally be granted under the zone-of-danger
rule whether the emotional harm is caused directly by the physical threat or results
from witnessing injury to another person similarly threatened.
Comment, supra note 4, at 368 n.20.
7" See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). In Palsgraf, the
plaintiff was injured as she stood on a train platform. Id. at 340, 162 N.E. at 99. Her
injuries were caused by an explosion of fireworks after a passenger had dropped them
while trying to board a train. Id. A conductor shoved the passenger to help him get on the
train. Id. The package fell, causing the fireworks to explode. Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 99. As
a result a scale was knocked over and injured the plaintiff who was 30 feet away. Id. The
court held that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff because she was outside the
zone-of-danger. Id.
71 See Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357. In Bovsun, the mother
and daughter were at risk from the same type of harm as the injured father, that is, being
hit by the defendant's car. Id. See also Comment, supra note 4, at 368 (zone-of-danger rule
widens scope of liability to situations without impact if plaintiff shows he was physically
threatened by defendant's negligent conduct).
"' Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697, 699, 512
N.E.2d 538, 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955, 955 (1987).
" 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). In Johnson, the plaintiff
sued a hospital for negligently misinforming her that her mother was dead. Id. at 379, 334
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involving the negligent transmission of a message announcing
death, and in those involving the negligent mishandling of
corpses, no showing of a physical manifestation of distress was
necessary for a recovery. 4 In Johnson, the court awarded recovery
based on the fact that the injury was inflicted by the defendant
directly on the plaintiff, by its negligent transmission of a false
message announcing her mother's death. 5
In Martinez, the court stated that where there is a duty owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty which results
directly in emotional harm is actionable. 6 While this appears to
be correct on its face, there are a number of policy considerations
which the court apparently overlooked in arriving at the decision.
In Battalla v. State, the court differentiated between allowing
recovery for emotional distress in the absence of physical injuries,
and allowing recovery when there is no physical manifestation of
the distress.7 In Battalla, the plaintiff demonstrated a physical
N.E.2d at 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 639. The plaintiff did not find out that the person for
whom she had made funeral arrangements was not her mother until shortly before the
wake. Id. The court allowed her a recovery for both pecuniary losses and emotional dis-
tress. Id.
74 Id. at 382, 334 N.E.2d at 592, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 641-42.
76 Id. at 383, 334 N.E.2d at 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 642. After noting the two exceptions
to the rule requiring a physical manifestation of emotional distress, the court stated: "The
false message and the events flowing from its receipt were the proximate cause of claim-
ant's emotional harm. Hence, claimant is entitled to recover for that harm, especially if
supported by objective manifestations of that harm." Id. Cf Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 62
N.Y.2d 523, 467 N.E.2d 502, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1984). In Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital, the
plaintiffs brought a claim against a hospital for emotional distress resulting from the abduc-
tion of their child from the hospital nursery. Id. at 525, 467 N.E.2d at 503, 478 N.Y.S.2d
at 839. The court denied a recovery for the emotional distress. Id. The plaintiff's alleged
that Johnson v. State would allow this action without a showing of physical manifestation. Id.
at 529, 467 N.E.2d at 505, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 841. However, the court limited the Johnson
holding to its specific facts, and held that it stood only for a recovery when a message
announcing death was negligently relayed. Id.
,6 Martinez, 70 N.Y.2d at 699, 512 N.E.2d at 538-39, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 955-56.
7 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
,8 Id. In Battalla, the court noted that it was possible to have severe emotional distress
when the plaintiff was not actually impacted. Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d
at 35. The requirement of a physical injury was deemed to be an artificial barrier to recov-
ery. Id. at 241, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37. The court also stated that the
requirement would encourage plaintiffs to perjure themselves. Id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at
731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38. The court held that as long as the plaintiff showed some physical
manifestation of the emotional injury, recovery was possible. Id. This, the court felt, was
sufficient to guarantee the genuineness of the claim. Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219
N.Y.S.2d 36.
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manifestation of the distress."0 This provided the court with a
guarantee that the claim was genuine. 0 The Martinez case neither
spoke of any showing of physical injuries nor placed the plaintiff
into one of the exceptions to the rule.8' The holding can be read
to suggest that New York no longer requires a showing of physical
manifestations of emotional distress for recovery based on negli-
gent conduct. It is submitted that abandoning this rule will open
the floodgates to a wide variety of lawsuits without any require-
ment that the plaintiff show the claim to be genuine.
III. VIEWING A SYSTEM WHERE No PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS ARE
REQUIRED
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,8 2 California allowed the
plaintiff to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress without any showing of physical harm whatsoever.8 The
plaintiff brought an action alleging emotional distress as a result
of the defendant's negligence in incorrectly diagnosing and treat-
ing his wife for syphilis." In granting a recovery, California's
highest court did away with the physical manifestation require-
ment.85 However, it limited recovery to cases of "serious" emo-
79 Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
80 Id.
81 See Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697, 699, 512
N.E.2d 538, 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (1987). In granting recovery, the court merely
stated that "where there is a breach of duty owed by the defendant to plaintiff, the breach
of that duty resulting directly in emotional harm is actionable." Id.
"' 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
8 Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832. The court concluded that "emo-
tional injury may be fully as severe and debilitating as physical harm, and is no less deserv-
ing of redress; the refusal to recognize a cause of action for negligently inflicted injury in
the absence of some physical consequence is therefore an anachronism." Id.
" Id.
Id. at 927, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837. The court found that the require-
ment of physical injury was unnecessary for two reasons. Id. First, the requirement is both
overinclusive and underinclusive. Id. The court said that with the requirement, defendants
would be exposed to emotional distress claims that are accompanied by trivial physical in-
jury. Id. The requirement also prevents claims from arising when the emotional distress is
severe but there is no physical manifestation. Id. The second problem with the require-
ment of physical injury is that it "encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testi-
mony." Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The court pointed out that in
most cases of severe mental disturbance, some physical consequence can be found. Id. at
929, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. See generally Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1059 (1936) (physical injury require-
ment encourages extravagant pleadings); Note, supra note 12, at 603-04 (examination of to
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tional distress."
In defining serious, the court used a definition set forth by the
Supreme Court of Hawaii.87 Serious emotional distress existed
"when a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable
to adequately cope with the mental distress engendered by the cir-
cumstances of the case.""M This definition proved problematic for
two reasons. First, the reasonable man standard is to be used to
define when conduct is negligent,86 not when the injury sustained
by the plaintiff is inappropriate for compensation. Secondly, use
of the standard flies directly in the face of the long standing tort
concept that the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him .9
Aside from the problems with the reasonable man standard,
there is an even more basic problem. In all cases involving physi-
cal injury, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish medical
proof of the injury." However, where the injury is of an emo-
tional nature, California does not require that sort of evidence."
It is much easier to feign an emotional injury and yet courts seem
to treat this claim more leniently. It is suggested that there is no
room in New York for this illogical type of decision-making.
whom defendant owes a duty); Note, supra note 13, at 186-87 (discussion of policy consid-
erations of physical manifestation requirement).
" See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
' See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
" See W. KETON, supra note 27, §§ 32-33. The theory of negligence law presupposes a
uniform standard of behavior. Id. The reasonable person was created as a basis against
which to measure the behavior of the tortfeasor. Id. The conduct of a reasonable person
varies with the situation in which he finds himself. Id. If a defendant does not act as a
reasonable person would have, he can be held liable for his actions which cause harm to
the plaintiff. Id.
" See Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., 304 N.Y. 457, 460, 108 N.E.2d 606, 608
(1952); Poplar v. Barjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 67-68, 80 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1948); McCahill v.
New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 223, 94 N.E. 616, 617 (1911); S. SCHREIBER, DAM-
AGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH CASES 313, 314 (1965); Note, supra note
13, at 196.
" See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59
GEo. L.J. 1237 (1971). Actual medical harm to a patient must be preliminarily established
in all personal injury cases. Id. at 1255 n.102.
" See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 839 (1980); Note, supra note 13, at 205.
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IV. RESOLVING THE PROBLEM
The Martinez decision cannot be supported by a zone-of-danger
analysis."a However, to put the case into the Johnson framework,
and provide that where the breach causes the distress recovery
should be afforded," would be disastrous. It is submitted that this
type of reasoning will lead New York into the dilemma in which
California presently finds itself.
It is suggested that to effectively grant recovery to Mrs. Marti-
nez, the court should have limited its holding to the specific facts
of the case and created a new exception to the physical injury re-
.quirement rule. Alternatively, the court should have required
Mrs. Martinez to show more than just a claim of emotional dis-
tress.9" In creating the exception for a Martinez situation, the
court should have analyzed the policy reasons for the rule itself,"
-as Martinez lends itself well to them. If, in the future, the New
York Court of Appeals limits Martinez to its facts, it will effectively
create this exception."' It is submitted that to do otherwise, would
be to turn the area of negligence law into an arena for the dishon-
est plaintiff and unduly burden our justice system.
CONCLUSION
Although a decision might appear to be balanced on principles
of fairness and equity, it is important that a court apply the law in
" See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
See Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center, 122 App. Div. 2d 122,
'123, 504 N.Y.S.2d 693, 694 (2d Dep't 1986). The appellate division denied a recovery. Id.
However, Justice Gibbons, dissenting, found that the plaintiff's claim "fits squarely within
the rationale of Johnson." Id. at 123, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 694 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). He
focused on the duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. Id.
" See Krause v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977);
Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952); Cook v. Maier, 33
Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939). See also Note, supra note 13, at 183 (California
courts have allowed nervous disorders, loss of sleep, humiliation and nausea to constitute a
physical manifestation of emotional distress).
' See supra notes 5 and 70 and accompanying text.
See Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1985).
The Tebbutt court illustrated how subsequent cases can arise to limit the language of a
previous holding. Id. at 932, 483 N.E.2d at 1143, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1011. The court
pointed out that Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp. limited the holding of Johnson v. State, to apply
only to cases involving the negligent transmission of a message announcing death. Id. at
933, 483 N.E.2d at 1143, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1012. See supra note 75.
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a consistent fashion. By quickly categorizing Martinez as a case in-
volving only a duty and a breach thereof, the court failed to ac-
knowledge the importance of protecting defendants from spurious
claims. If the Martinez holding is not limited to its specific facts,
New York will lose an effective deterrent to such spurious claims.
Edward M. Pinter
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